Core inflation, which took one step-down during covid, has this year dropped again. Indeed, China has now been in sequential core CPI deflation since May. This implies rising real interest rates, and, with PPI turning down again too, a worsening debt burden.
As expected, the BOK's cut on Friday was hawkish. However, while I thought the bank would express some concern about services inflation, its only worry seems to be that lower rates will give a new boost to real estate. If housing is calm, the consensus will thus expect rates to fall further.
There was a decent bounce in per capita household incomes through Q2. But the rise in consumption was smaller, with better incomes fuelling stronger savings rather than much more spending. The Q2 BOJ consumer survey shows the big worry at the household level remains the high level of prices.
The MOF presser today was underwhelming, in both quantity and quality. The one real, positive change is allowing fiscal funds to be used to address the supply overhang in property, but only at the local government level (and, it seems, using existing funds). Markets are unlikely to be impressed.
Household incomes bounced in 1H24, boosted by fiscal policy (welfare benefits and Kishisha's tax cuts), as well as property income and solid wage growth. This is an important change, given the big problem with aggergate demand has been the weakness of consumption.
Much has been made of the US overtaking China as Taiwan's biggest market. One consequence is a surge in the trade surplus with the US to over 10% of GDP. That will likely attract a lot more political attention in the event of a Trump re-election.
There is a broad consensus that the BOK will cut this Friday. I wouldn't push back strongly against that expectation. But I don't think the bank can be too doveish when private services inflation – a proxy for domestically generated inflation – has been rebounding back above 2%.
Data continue to show little change in the constructive economic assessment that the BOJ was talking about in 1H24. The Economy Watchers survey for September ticked down, but is well above the LT average, and the outlook score is higher still. Growth in underlying wages remains firm.
My base case - that the economy won't turnaround without fiscal – isn't especially differentiated. But the reports of stronger real estate sales in the holiday highlight a risk case: that the equity rally mobilises household savings and boosts price expectations, lifting the economy without fiscal.
After a better Q2, consumption looks to have basically flat-lined again in July-August, capping any upside in GDP. Consumption isn't falling again, and last week's consumer confidence survey suggests no new deterioration in September. But there is downside risk if the JPY continues to weaken.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
I had an op-ed piece in today's Nikkei Asia. The headline argument is that monetary policy isn't sufficient to boost growth. On its own, that isn't much of a differentiated view. The nuance is the reasoning: China has monetary policy independence, so Fed cuts in themselves don't change anything.
Overall, data are falling into place for a BOK cut. Exports were firm in September, but the PMI was terrible. Headline CPI dropped under 2% for the first time since 2021, and property prices might be decelerating. The one counter-trend is services CPI, which has rebounded to 3%.
It wasn't just in Taiwan. Korea's PMI also fell sharply last month. The deterioration is puzzling, not being seen in other surveys, nor in Korea's September exports. So probably, it is noise. But data patchiness has been a theme of recent months, suggesting underlying cycles are rather so-so.
The detailed Q3 BOJ Tankan shows both labour market tightness and corporate output price expectations remaining as elevated as any time since the 1980s. Clearly, the economy hasn't been derailed by the market volatility of early August, and without a new shock, the BOJ seems likely to hike again.
Data today show headline inflation fell below the BOK's 2% target in September for the first time since April 2021. But core inflation isn't continuing to drop. Sequential core looks to be bottoming around 1.8%, and the rebound in personal services inflation is continuing, from 2% in Q1 to 3% now.
Taiwan manufacturing should be on a big upswing, driven by recovery from the 2022-23 recession, and AI demand for semis. And yet, even before now, data have been patchy, and the PMIs suggest that mfg started to contract again in September. If that's the end of the upturn, it didn't last long.
The equities move has been extreme. To argue that this heralds broader economic recovery relies on: 1) the YC moving next as savings get mobilised; 2) the YC mattering less as an indicator than equities. Both are possible, but while the YC has issues as a leading indicator, so does the stockmarket.
Ueda's caution and now politics are the big near-term policy dynamics. Politics might affect monetary policy longer-term, if Ishiba's as PM is as hawkish as his reputation. But the cycle hasn't been derailed yet, with the Q3 Tankan showing sentiment, the labour market and pricing all remaining firm.
To think the equity recovery is lifting overall growth, things to watch include: the yield curve; real estate debt; PBC base money; and household deposits. Since Friday, the YC and real estate debt have moved, but not significantly yet. Base money and HH time deposit data are lagging.
Equities say that data are now dated, with PBC policy meaning a decent recovery is in the works. But in assessing whether that's right, the data are important, showing how much work policy needs to do. The PMIs were weaker again in September, with the construction PMI, especially, rarely worse.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
I've already posed the question of why the PBC only cut 20 bp. Today, I've got a follow-up: why wasn't fiscal announced at the same time? Reports suggest that is in the works, but China is best-placed of anywhere to do coordinated monetary-fiscal. It feels significant that this didn't happen.
Underlying core inflation in Tokyo in September continued to run at around a 2% annualised rate. The trimmed mean has stabilised at a bit below that, and the proportion of rising items has ticked up. Inflation isn't accelerating, but there's no sign of a slowdown either.
The 17% YoY fall in profits in August is exaggerated by comparison with the spike 12M previously. But the details are sluggish. Corporate revenues haven't yet regained the level of November 2023, and except for early 2023, the profit share of GDP is lower than any time since 2009.