East Asia Econ

March machine orders surged, which could be tariff-related, but the strength was in domestic not foreign orders. Anyway, it seems unlikely to last, with today's flash May PMI repeating the downbeat message of the EW, with business confidence "the second-lowest recorded" since 2020.

After adjusting for days worked, Korea's exports in the first 20 days of May fell YoY for the second consecutive month. But this isn't a tariff shock: in level terms, exports peaked back in mid-2024. If anything, May was a bit stronger, led by a rebound in semiconductor shipments.

YoY import prices are falling everywhere. The implications are mixed. It is contributing to a drop in PPI inflation in Korea, but an intensification of deflation in China. In Japan, meanwhile, PPI inflation remains elevated, supported by the cumulative rise in import prices of recent years.

Optimistically, you could argue that the sharper drop in upstream prices though May is driven by the falling global oil price, a decline that is good news for China. But the details show the prices of other products are dropping too, and the upshot will be a yet faster pace of PPI deflation.

The gap between PPI and import prices is a useful way of thinking about inflation and the BOJ. Usually, the gap is closed as import prices are cut by a combination of global recession and JPY strength. If neither happens, PPI inflation isn't likely to recede, and BOJ hikes will remain on the table.

A key component of the structural shift in the economy is rising wages. That continued in March, with signs of another acceleration in manufacturing wage growth on the back of strong exports. As a result, overall wage growth is once again over 3%, as quick as during the recovery out of covid.

The sharp drop in exports in the first 10 days of May doesn't show tariffs are having an impact. Rather, the decline was because of a fall in the number of working days. But the data do show that Korea's export cycle remains weak, with shipments in level terms treading water for a year.

Data released yesterday showed April as being another boom month for Taiwan exports. TSMC's sales today suggest exports might be stronger still, with TSMC's revenue rising even more quickly than in the 2020-21 post-covid recovery. That's remarkable, even allowing for front-loading.

A lot of market discussion in recent days has centred on hedging by the lifers. The central bank, however, has argued that the move in the TWD was driven by exporters. That is believable: exports grew remarkably strongly in 2020-22, and have done so again through April this year.

My framework for Taiwan and the TWD is a structural economic recovery driving a normalisation of inflation after the near deflation of the 20 years before 2020. That remains the theme, but there is now a clear cyclical slowing of CPI. That will intensify if tariffs trigger an export recession.

The exact timing of monetary easing can vary, but today's interest rate and RRR cuts are not a surprise. Today's moves are consistent with the PBC's usual reaction function, and with inflation so weak, further loosening should be expected.

Politically, China might well be prepared for the trade war. But I remain sceptical that is true economically. The headline of today's Caixin services PMI was soft, and the commentary noted confidence falling "to the second-lowest level recorded since data collection began in November 2005".

Given the global uncertainty, the headline manufacturing PMIs released in the last couple of days for China and Japan didn't look too bad. The tariff impact is much more visible in today's Korea and Taiwan PMIs, both of which declined sharply.

Today's BOJ's GDP downgrades were all about tariffs affecting corporates. The bank didn't sound worried about consumption. But in today's data releases, the manufacturing PMI ticked up, while consumer confidence fell sharply to a level that's only been lower three times in the survey's history.

The gap in GDP growth that has opened up between Korea and Taiwan since 2020 reflects exports, but also consumption. Data today show Korean retail sales did perk up in March. But even after that, sales are still barely above the level of late 2019, while in Taiwan they've grown almost 15%.

Goods consumption in Japan continues to struggle, with real etail sales dropping in March back to the lowest level in two years. Services consumption has been stronger, but the renewed deterioration coincides with a rebound in inflation, which is once again squeezing real incomes.

Korea was weak even before tariffs, contrasting with more resilience in Taiwan and Japan. In Taiwan, that's been because exports have offset weakening domestic demand, a pattern that hasn't yet changed: consumer confidence declined again in April, but the monitoring index through March held up.

YoY services PPI in March continued to run at above 3%, led by price rises in more labour-intensive sectors. Sequential momentum has eased a bit in recent months, but should get another boost in April, as the latest annual wage round feeds into price rises at the beginning of the new fiscal year.

As with the Reuters Tankan, the S&P manufacturing PMI didn't fall in April. The services PMI also rebounded, and the commentary shows no sign in the trend: "inflationary pressures strengthened, with input prices rising at the sharpest pace since February 2023 and output charges increasing solidly"

The clearing of some of Korea's political uncertainty hasn't helped consumer confidence. It hardly rose in April, even though the survey was taken after Yoon's impeachment verdict. Inflation expectations remained near 3%. Property price expectations also ticked up, but not as quickly as in March.

Taiwan isn't seeing the big supply-side labour market shifts visible in Japan and Korea. The participation rate hasn't risen, and the proportion of part-time jobs remains in low single digits. As a result, ageing is constraining labour supply in a way that hasn't been apparent elsewhere.

Japan shows signs of pent-up inflationary pressure, with PPI rising despite a decline in import prices. In Korea, by contrast, the usual relationship hasn't broken. If USD strength really has ended, KRW import prices will decline further, making it easier for the BOK to focus on the weak cycle.

Exports for the first 20 days of April were weak, falling -5.2% YoY. That isn't because of tariffs: the downcycle in Korean exports began in mid-2024. With tariffs, however, the weakness in exports can be expected to intensify. The equity market is already pricing in double-digit declines.

My leading indicator suggests a clear rolling over of the export cycle even before the real hit from tariffs begins. It might be a bit too early yet for that hit to be showing up in hard export data, but next Monday's trade statistics for Korea for the first 20 days of April will be a test.

JBRC this week reported March part-time wage growth jumping to 5.6% YoY. Some of that looks like catch-up with the official data, but the commentary was interesting, with the rise being attributed in part to this year's shunto. The labour market continues to look very tight.