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The three red lines and covid delivered a huge, multi-year blow to the economy. Multiple signs have started to emerge that this hit has been absorbed, and that China macro is stabilising. This suggests that the recent lessening of deflation might prove durable, with broad implications across markets
The broad theme is macro is stabilisation, shown by three indicators that are bottoming after multi-year declines: property starts, household demand deposits, and producer prices. The implications, as are already being seen, are slower rate cuts, stabilising yields, and a stronger currency.
Today's trade data for March don't get us so far: only headline data have been released, and underlying trends are still obscured by Chinese New Year distortions. Overall, however, exports look firm, with auto sales rising again. Imports are very strong, but that is more about chips than energy.
The lessening of deflation has largely been driven by external factors. But domestic monetary developments have helped: the increase in PBC liquidity injections, and as shown again by today's March monetary release, the stabilisation of M1 growth and the M1:M2 ratio.
That the return of PPI inflation in March was driven by an energy price shock isn't positive. In fact, though, the recovery in PPI pre-dates the Iran war, beginning in June last year. Positive inflation reinforces the macro narrative that China's cycle is more stable, supporting rates and the CNY.
The sharp rise in input prices in today's PMIs move China back towards rising YoY PPI for the first time since 2022. Usually, higher prices would boost PMIs too. With the rise in prices externally-driven, that is less likely now. But, I think some inflation does improve the macro cycle for China.
1) Goods and services output growing ~5% is enough for Beijing; 2) money and credit growth don't suggest a lot of change in that underlying trajectory; 3) nominal momentum is improving, with an end of PPI deflation now a real possibility; 4) the likelihood of further monetary easing is falling.
Exports in YoY and SA terms were strong in Jan-Feb. That looks too good to be true, and I'd expect new year distortions won't totally disappear until March. Still, one trend that looks real is the rise in chip exports, as China benefits from the same semi super cycle lifting the rest of the region.
Deflation momentum continued to lessen in February, a trend that will now be given a further boost by global oil prices. But with this shift in the direction of deflation being driven by external factors, it isn't based on the sort of improvement in domestic growth that is needed for sustainability.
The S&P/RatingDog PMIs suggest an economy that is finally recovering. The official PMIs, by contrast, indicate continued sluggishness. I am inclined to think there is no change, at least until the LNY impact fades. The one common theme is firmer input prices, even before an energy price shock.
January fx settlement data suggest large fx intervention for a second consecutive month. One reason is the CA surplus, which other data today show widened in Q4. Another is interest rates which are more stable, even though monetary trends aren't changing much, and property prices continue to fall.
CPI inflation softened in January, but it always does when the new year holiday falls in February. PPI has less seasonal distortion, and rose MoM in January for the second consecutive time. The GDP deflator is likely to improve again in Q1. This is about external factors, but deflation is lessening.
Today's official PMIs were below 50. That shows the domestic economy is weak – though the data were likely pulled down by the coming holiday. More interesting was the further rise in prices in manufacturing. That change relates to USD/global prices, but does suggest an upturn in nominal momentum.
Like the actual monthly deposit data, Friday's PBC Q425 depositor survey shows a slowing of the flood of household savings into the safety of bank deposits. The structural deflation pressure caused by the collapse of real estate activity and the chaos of the covid lockdowns is beginning to ease.
Most important for markets is today's Q4 data is the pick-up in the deflator and nominal GDP, which external trends suggest can run further. In terms of the details, the data show two big discrepancies: collapsing FAI v industrial stability, and falling retail sales v rising consumption share of GDP
Some of the signs of domestic stabilisation I'd been tracking in 2025 faded into year-end. However, they didn't disappear entirely. China is also starting to benefit from the global tailwinds of weaker USD and rising commodity prices, creating upside risks for China's nominal cycle.
China's release today of December data for money, credit and fx settlement tell three stories: domestic savings outflows have lost momentum, credit ex-government is looking a bit stronger, and capital inflows are really picking up. If right, the last dynamic is the most important for markets.
The second-derivative improvement in inflation is continuing, and should be seen in a better deflator when the Q4 GDP data are released later this month. However, there's not yet enough to think the trend can persist beyond Q126. One factor that could derail the improvement would be a stronger CNY.
My latest video, discussing the lessening of deflationary pressure, whether that can continue, and what the implications are for markets.
Like last month, November data show a contrast between real weakness in some areas of the economy (such as property, goods consumption) and more stability in others (pricing, output). Overall, however, the balance is once again shifting towards more weakness.
Real economy developments still look negative for inflation. That the deflator nonetheless looks to be turning can be partly attributed to local food prices and global commodity prices. However, I think monetary factors are also playing a role, with three dynamics in particular worth highlighting.
Today's inflation data weren't surprising, with the big shift being food prices lifting CPI. Non-food prices aren't rising, but in level terms aren't falling either, which is an improvement from 1H25. Nominal growth should look better through Q126.
The weakness in exports of October reversed in November, with a rebound in growth to ROW, and shipments to the US stabilising. Auto shipments reached a new all-time high, and are growing as quickly this year as in the initial take-off in 2023-24. Import demand declined, so the trade surplus rose.
High-frequency data show upstream prices remained stable in November, while food prices have been rising. The combination points to a further lessening of headline deflation. I doubt that signals a real turn in nominal growth, though there are now some upside risks.
The official composite output PMI in November fell below 50. That wasn't because of FAI: the industrial PMIs were stable. Rather, it was weakness in services. That is puzzling. For now, the one concrete indicator from today's inflation is actually positive: deflation isn't getting worse.