East Asia Econ

My latest video discussing the inflation outlook. Apart from the anti-involution drive, the stabilisation of demand deposits and property do ease the downwards pressure on prices. But the weakness of aggregate demand remains, and as yesterday's PMI suggested, the outlook for prices remains subdued.

While the PMIs don't point to any real improvement, in nominal terms there's been a lift, with input prices above 50 again. That's in line with the credit impulse. But the credit impulse might already have turned, and while PPI deflation has lessened, output prices don't suggest stronger CPI.

This is a dashboard I've been working on, where you can map China's auto exports by country and type of vehicle over time. It now includes volume and prices at a national level. I'll be adding more series over the next few weeks. I also have a favour to ask.

Property prices and sales, investment and retail sales all deteriorated in July. It is at least possible to argue that the worst of the drop in property activity is now completed. That creates room for second-derivative improvement, but even that could be offset by slowing manufacturing capex.

I missed this release earlier today. The rise in the credit impulse stalled in July, dampened by slower government, non-state and mortgage borrowing. However, the monetary data remain a bit more constructive: while the recovery in M1 growth slowed, the bottoming relative to M2 remains intact.

Today's official data show core CPI has rebounded to almost +1%. That would be an important change, but at best it looks narrow, with almost all the rise coming from "miscellaneous goods and services". The leads from PPI and the PMI remain soft. Separately, yesterday's CA data for Q2 were stable.

Overall exports still don't show a tariff hit, with shipments to ROW offsetting the weakness of direct sales to the US. Imports are more interesting, with signs emerging of an upturn. That so far is (very) mild, but has been enough to cap the trade surplus, albeit at the high level of USD100bn.

Deflation looks like 1990s Japan. But China's exchange rate doesn't. Real CNY depreciation helps exports substitute for the weakness of domestic demand in a way that didn't happen in Japan. It also postpones the sort of stimulus that would ease deflation and provide more direction for markets.

Two things. First, my latest video, discussing what's not surprising about the trade surplus (the rise in capital goods), and what is (that for exports China's global market share gains have accelerated, while for imports, they've fallen). Second, an interactive dashboard on China's auto exports.

The weakness was true even for pricing, which is the focus of the most recent policy push: input prices did improve MoM, but not to over 50, and output prices fell further. That Beijing has turned its attention to oversupply should help equities, but I am doubtful that alone produces macro recovery.

Does anti-involution produce macro turnaround when the September combination of stock market and local government bail-out failed? The markets are hopeful. I am more cautious, given China's macro problems are weak demand as well as strong supply. I'd be wrong if household savings behaviour shifts.

The government is increasingly focused on the supply-side issue of corporate involution as the driver of unwanted deflation and weak corporate earnings. However, the decline in profits has been led by heavy industry, showing the importance of the weakness of property and aggregate demand.

Markets have perked up on hopes that officials will tackle over-supply. But belated publication yesterday at 8pm (!) of the PBC's quarterly opinion surveys is a reminder that business involution isn't the only challenge. Household price, income and employment expectations all continue to fall.

Based on official data, tariffs have as yet to cause any real reversal in the surge of export volumes that's now been underway for two years. That's even though export prices have, for the first time since 2003, started to rise YoY. It isn't obvious that China is absorbing the cost of the tariffs.

Today's release of more details of Q2 GDP are interesting, if puzzling. GDP was held up by a larger contribution from investment, even though construction contracted for the first time since early 2022. The weakness of construction does, however, further the economy's steady shift towards services.

Two things stand out in today's big macro release. First, more signs of property bottoming. But there's no indication of a pick-up, which matters given the second takeaway: the weakness of nominal GDP. On my numbers, that grew just 2.4% QoQ annualised, with the fall in the deflator accelerating.

Property price deflation intensified in June, albeit only mildly. Leading indicators suggest there shouldn't be a new step-down, but only interest rates point to real upside – and interest rates stopped being a reliable lead for the property market some time ago.

Continuing recent trends, credit and money data were stronger in June. That helps put a floor under the cycle. The details were softer, with credit growth dependent on government borrowing and mortgage lending still slow. But there are some signs of an upturn in lending to the non-state sector.

There aren't signs – yet – of China's export juggernaut hitting a wall. The big fall in US exports eased in June, allowing overall exports to continue to creep up, reaching a new post-2022 high. Imports, meanwhile, continue to flat-line, so the trade surplus remains large.

I am away from my desk, so for now, just a few charts on the CPI/PPI release. Deflation is deepening, which for PPI is broad-based. Core CPI is more stable, but that's partly due to a rise in "other" prices. Headline CPI is lower on food prices, which have started dropping again.

Recent data show investment fell in 2024 to under 40% for the first time since 2008. On the flip side, consumption edged up, helped by a stabilisation of the savings ratio and a rise in welfare spending. But none of these changes are happening fast enough to boost the cycle.

At a headline level, the industrial PMIs were better in June, but the details were weak, and there was no improvement in the services PMI. The rise in the credit impulse is taking away some of the downside risk for the cycle, but there aren't indications that the cycle is about to really improve.

Profits fell 9% YoY in May, and are now close to 5% of GDP, a level that's only been breached twice in the last 15 years. The driver is more demand- than supply-side, in the sense that the upstream profits, hit by the property downturn, are weakest. But even in machinery, profits aren't rising.

Given regional history, China's transition to exporting more capital goods shouldn't be unexpected. More unusual is that 1) this transition hasn't been accompanied by slower overall export growth, and 2) has occurred at the same time as a sharp slowing of imports. Chart pack attached.

Overall trade trends – strong exports, weak imports, and a big trade surplus – remain in place. But the Trump tariffs are causing big shifts in the structure of exports. Direct shipments to the US have fallen 40% this year, and excluding the pandemic, haven't been this low since 2013.