East Asia Econ

A "moderately loose" stance seems encouraging. But effecting that isn't straightforward, given nominal rates and the RRR are now so low. Rather than nominal, policy needs to work on price. That can be done by PBC BS expansion that addresses property inventories, or fiscal policy that raises demand.

After falling for most of the year, core CPI rose MoM in November. However, the impact on overall CPI was offset by a renewed softening of food prices, and PPI also remained in deflation. PPI will likely strengthen a bit more from here, but overall, deflation is still the bigger risk than inflation.

As a long-time fan, I was very pleased to have a piece in the latest China Leadership Monitor. It argues that while cyclically, spending hasn't been so bad, that isn't enough given the property bust. Even so, and despite interesting proposals from onshore economists, policy support is still lacking.

In November, the manufacturing PMI ticked up again, but the construction PMI continued to fall. But it would be optimistic to think this shows industry becoming less dependent on real estate when prices rolled over, the services PMI remains very weak, and employment continues to fall.

A chart-heavy note updating China's trade trends. Export volume growth remains strong; prices are soft but not falling sharply; EV growth is sluggish but solar stronger; direct trade continues to reorient towards EM; the growing trade surplus helps GDP growth, but not relations with the US.

A few weeks ago, we laid out a list of indicators to be watching to track whether all the policy announcements from China were generating a turn in the cycle. Looking through that list now, and it remains difficult to feel excited that they have.

With a bounce in reported retail sales, it looks like economic growth in October got back to the government's 5% growth target. Overall, though, the tone of the data was rather mixed, with real estate activity in particular still extremely weak.

The bond swap does represent substantive policy. But there still isn't support for consumption, so this does look like an effort to put a floor under growth, rather than produce a new upcycle. And while that will probably be successful, stability will be endangered by a new round of Trump tariffs.

A chart pack arguing that consumption hasn't been as weak as is often imagined, but that downside risks are growing as wage and property income falls. Policy solutions need to overcome the weakness of non-wage incomes, the strength of savings, and the pro-investment official mindset.

Likely driven by the sentiment-driven rise in prices, the manufacturing PMI bounced back above 50 in October. But there was barely any change in either the services or construction, PMIs, and both will need to improve to think that the economy really is turning around.

The government yesterday published its monthly series for the profits of the industrial sector. I am always a bit sceptical of the quality of these data. But if you want a trigger for the recent macro policy push, then the sharp fall in profits in September fits the bill.

The slump in confidence and retail sales don't indicate a major cyclical weakening of consumption. That's partly because households have been running down excess savings from covid. But with savings now normalising, consumption is becoming more vulnerable to the deterioration in the labour market.

Looking at today's data, the driver of all the recent policy activism is to get growth back to the 5% target. That doesn't suggest a big rebound in the nominal growth that equity investors need. The upside risk is this policy push is happening when there are tentative signs of property stabilising.

Cyclically, credit is very weak, especially private sector borrowing. But credit is still rising relative to GDP. That's partly because of government borrowing. But it is also because of weak nominal GDP growth, and that is unlikely to change until the sharp fall in M1 relative to M2 reverses.

Exports dropped quite sharply in September. China is still making share gains in autos especially, but this is another sign that the best of the recovery in the regional export cycle is probably now done. That matters for China when exports have been the strongest sector of the economy.

Core inflation, which took one step-down during covid, has this year dropped again. Indeed, China has now been in sequential core CPI deflation since May. This implies rising real interest rates, and, with PPI turning down again too, a worsening debt burden.

The MOF presser today was underwhelming, in both quantity and quality. The one real, positive change is allowing fiscal funds to be used to address the supply overhang in property, but only at the local government level (and, it seems, using existing funds). Markets are unlikely to be impressed.

My base case - that the economy won't turnaround without fiscal – isn't especially differentiated. But the reports of stronger real estate sales in the holiday highlight a risk case: that the equity rally mobilises household savings and boosts price expectations, lifting the economy without fiscal.

I had an op-ed piece in today's Nikkei Asia. The headline argument is that monetary policy isn't sufficient to boost growth. On its own, that isn't much of a differentiated view. The nuance is the reasoning: China has monetary policy independence, so Fed cuts in themselves don't change anything.

To think the equity recovery is lifting overall growth, things to watch include: the yield curve; real estate debt; PBC base money; and household deposits. Since Friday, the YC and real estate debt have moved, but not significantly yet. Base money and HH time deposit data are lagging.

Equities say that data are now dated, with PBC policy meaning a decent recovery is in the works. But in assessing whether that's right, the data are important, showing how much work policy needs to do. The PMIs were weaker again in September, with the construction PMI, especially, rarely worse.

I've already posed the question of why the PBC only cut 20 bp. Today, I've got a follow-up: why wasn't fiscal announced at the same time? Reports suggest that is in the works, but China is best-placed of anywhere to do coordinated monetary-fiscal. It feels significant that this didn't happen.

This to me is the interesting question about yesterday: given weak prices, and now CNY appreciation, why wasn't the rate cut bigger?

China's imports are two-speed. That's like the economy, but with a big difference: whereas for macro it is property that is weak while mfg is strong, for imports it is commodities that are more resilient than capital goods. Like the overall macro muddle through, that resilience likely can't last.

August data suggest GDP is now only growing by around 4% YoY. The headwinds remain property activity, which dropped again in August to new lows, and retail sales, which has now contracted MoM in five of the first eight months of 2024. Sustaining muddle through is getting much more difficult.