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CPI was surprisingly firm in May, with core continuing to show a reversal from the deflation of 2024. Overall, however, nominal indicators remain very weak. Leads for core have started to deteriorated again, and PPI deflation accelerated in May. The GDP deflator will be negative once again in Q2.
The manufacturing PMI did improve in May, lifted by a bounce in export orders. But there's no sign of a turnaround in the underlying economy, with the construction PMI weak, output prices softening, and business confidence remaining poor.
Official industrial earnings show profitability deteriorating again. A rebound would be first seen in rising prices and improving corporate sentiment, neither of which is yet visible. The weakness is concentrated in heavy industry, but profitability in downstream sectors is only flat-lining.
Headline YoY data are still benefiting from the Q4 pick-up, meaning another 5% growth quarter is likely. But sequentially, growth is slowing again, with no sign of any turnaround in construction that might put a sustainable floor under the overall economy.
After a clear improvement from September, property price deflation since December has settled at an annualised pace of around -1.5%. Sluggish mortgage lending isn't pointing to a further recovery from here. On these official data, average prices are now down 6% from the peak in 2021.
Today's monetary data continue to suggest that the economy has bottomed, but don't point to a big recovery. Non-state and mortgage lending have stopped deteriorating, but don't show signs of the sort of recovery that would lift economic activity.
After the deflation of much of 2024, core sequential inflation has now been positive for six months. But it is now still only +0.2% annualised, and doesn't look to be going higher. Indicators for PPI suggest even more deflation ahead, with the one exception being the decline in the USD.
The expected fall in exports to the US did happen in April, but that was offset by stronger shipments to ROW. I wouldn't expect that to continue, but it is worth noting that today's data showed an increase in imports of components, which would usually indicate stronger exports in the next 3M.
Export orders fell sharply in April, but the PMIs overall weren't so bad. One reason is a bottoming of the construction cycle. That, however, isn't improving, and with prices and the business outlook falling again, the economy still isn't on a stable footing to get through the tariff shock.
Profits did rise YoY in March, but because of the base effect. Relative to GDP, earnings remain sluggish. Unsurprisingly, given the collapse of real estate, heavy industry is weakest. But in manufacturing, aggregate earnings aren't strong either, and around one-third of all firms are losing money.
Since June last year, there has been a real inflection in retail sales and some construction indicators. In Q1, however, real estate remained as weak as ever. Manufacturing FAI is strong, but that has to be at risk from the trade war. Overall, the economy still isn't on a firm footing.
The second of two videos on consumption, an issue that is even more important given the economic damage that will be inflicted on China by the tariffs. It is impossible to imagine Beijing supporting western-style consumerism. But there is still a way for economic policy to boost consumer spending.
Exports through March were solid, but not so strong as to suggest big front-loading. The real standout is the import ratio dropping to a new post-1990s low. The trade surplus upsets Trump. Equally though, weak imports limit China's appeal as a market for others looking for an alternative to the US.
Credit and monetary data continue to suggest the monetary squeeze of 2023 and 1H24 has ended. The significance of the rebound is offset by three factors: it isn't incorporating non-government borrowing; mortgage lending isn't rising; and definitional changes to M1.
The rise in core from Q424 sustained in Q125. But that isn't enough to suggest a turnaround in the GDP deflator, and Trump's tariffs mean that downside risks to inflation have grown again. Policy rates are likely to be cut, but that won't be enough to offset this latest shock.
The first of two videos on consumption. This one looks at recent trends, arguing spending has been stronger than often realised. It still isn't high enough, especially given the huge shock from Trump's tariffs. So the second discusses policies that would boost consumption further.
Yesterday's tariffs are close to a worse case scenario for China, and are a big negative shock when the cycle is already weak. Three things strike me as important in what happens next, both for China's economy, and for its global influence: consumption, imports, and the currency.
In recent months, I've been doing quite a lot of work on Japanification. I summarised the arguments in this opinion piece for The Wire China.
The PMIs suggest the economy, once again, is muddling through. The better momentum after the policy announcements that started from September has faded, but isn't reversing. However, that probably isn't enough, given the new shock from tariffs that is about to hit.
The PBC sentiment surveys suggest again an economy that is muddling through. One reason is that consumer spending hasn't fallen, with the big shifts instead being a further move away from consumption on goods to spending on services, and more saving in bank deposits rather than investments.
A follow-up to the video a couple of weeks ago. That looked at demand-side factors. This delves into the supply-side and factors behind the "deflationary mindset". In these areas, China today looks even more different from Japan in the 1990s.
My view has been that China's cycle is probably stabilising, but not recovering. Today's data are consistent with that. Production of goods and services is running a bit over 5%, but property starts continue to fall, and retail sales don't point to any inflection in consumption
The upturn in credit growth that began in June last year is continuing. That should be helping to put a floor under nominal growth. But that comes with caveats: private-sector credit lost momentum in February, and while mortgage lending isn't slowing, it doesn't show any sign of a rebound either.
A decline in CPI in February was to be expected, given Chinese New Year fell in January, and there are tentative signs of deflation pressure easing. Food prices have stabilised so far in March. And the decline in core in February wasn't enough fully to reverse the strengthening seen since Q4.
A video discussing why China isn't following Japan's path. This is the first part, looking at the seven demand-side factors that caused Japan's problems, and how China compares. The second video will discuss supply-side issues and the "deflationary mindset".