This is a dashboard I've been working on, where you can map China's auto exports by country and type of vehicle over time. It now includes volume and prices at a national level. I'll be adding more series over the next few weeks. I also have a favour to ask.

Property prices and sales, investment and retail sales all deteriorated in July. It is at least possible to argue that the worst of the drop in property activity is now completed. That creates room for second-derivative improvement, but even that could be offset by slowing manufacturing capex.

I missed this release earlier today. The rise in the credit impulse stalled in July, dampened by slower government, non-state and mortgage borrowing. However, the monetary data remain a bit more constructive: while the recovery in M1 growth slowed, the bottoming relative to M2 remains intact.

Today's official data show core CPI has rebounded to almost +1%. That would be an important change, but at best it looks narrow, with almost all the rise coming from "miscellaneous goods and services". The leads from PPI and the PMI remain soft. Separately, yesterday's CA data for Q2 were stable.

Overall exports still don't show a tariff hit, with shipments to ROW offsetting the weakness of direct sales to the US. Imports are more interesting, with signs emerging of an upturn. That so far is (very) mild, but has been enough to cap the trade surplus, albeit at the high level of USD100bn.

Deflation looks like 1990s Japan. But China's exchange rate doesn't. Real CNY depreciation helps exports substitute for the weakness of domestic demand in a way that didn't happen in Japan. It also postpones the sort of stimulus that would ease deflation and provide more direction for markets.

Two things. First, my latest video, discussing what's not surprising about the trade surplus (the rise in capital goods), and what is (that for exports China's global market share gains have accelerated, while for imports, they've fallen). Second, an interactive dashboard on China's auto exports.

The weakness was true even for pricing, which is the focus of the most recent policy push: input prices did improve MoM, but not to over 50, and output prices fell further. That Beijing has turned its attention to oversupply should help equities, but I am doubtful that alone produces macro recovery.

Does anti-involution produce macro turnaround when the September combination of stock market and local government bail-out failed? The markets are hopeful. I am more cautious, given China's macro problems are weak demand as well as strong supply. I'd be wrong if household savings behaviour shifts.