Export orders fell sharply in April, but the PMIs overall weren't so bad. One reason is a bottoming of the construction cycle. That, however, isn't improving, and with prices and the business outlook falling again, the economy still isn't on a stable footing to get through the tariff shock.

Profits did rise YoY in March, but because of the base effect. Relative to GDP, earnings remain sluggish. Unsurprisingly, given the collapse of real estate, heavy industry is weakest. But in manufacturing, aggregate earnings aren't strong either, and around one-third of all firms are losing money.

Since June last year, there has been a real inflection in retail sales and some construction indicators. In Q1, however, real estate remained as weak as ever. Manufacturing FAI is strong, but that has to be at risk from the trade war. Overall, the economy still isn't on a firm footing.

The second of two videos on consumption, an issue that is even more important given the economic damage that will be inflicted on China by the tariffs. It is impossible to imagine Beijing supporting western-style consumerism. But there is still a way for economic policy to boost consumer spending.

Exports through March were solid, but not so strong as to suggest big front-loading. The real standout is the import ratio dropping to a new post-1990s low. The trade surplus upsets Trump. Equally though, weak imports limit China's appeal as a market for others looking for an alternative to the US.

Credit and monetary data continue to suggest the monetary squeeze of 2023 and 1H24 has ended. The significance of the rebound is offset by three factors: it isn't incorporating non-government borrowing; mortgage lending isn't rising; and definitional changes to M1.

The rise in core from Q424 sustained in Q125. But that isn't enough to suggest a turnaround in the GDP deflator, and Trump's tariffs mean that downside risks to inflation have grown again. Policy rates are likely to be cut, but that won't be enough to offset this latest shock.

The first of two videos on consumption. This one looks at recent trends, arguing spending has been stronger than often realised. It still isn't high enough, especially given the huge shock from Trump's tariffs. So the second discusses policies that would boost consumption further.

Yesterday's tariffs are close to a worse case scenario for China, and are a big negative shock when the cycle is already weak. Three things strike me as important in what happens next, both for China's economy, and for its global influence: consumption, imports, and the currency.