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Two themes stand out. First, macro in China is stabilising following the multi-year decline triggered by the twin shocks of the three red lines and zero covid. Second, the chip supercycle has yet to be derailed by the Iran War.
The broad theme is macro is stabilisation, shown by three indicators that are bottoming after multi-year declines: property starts, household demand deposits, and producer prices. The implications, as are already being seen, are slower rate cuts, stabilising yields, and a stronger currency.
Energy import prices surged 50% in March, and that will undoubtedly raise inflation. However, Korea's terms of trade actually continued to rise (just about), helped by the continued sharp rise in chip export prices. For Korean growth, there is an offset to this energy crisis.
Today's trade data for March don't get us so far: only headline data have been released, and underlying trends are still obscured by Chinese New Year distortions. Overall, however, exports look firm, with auto sales rising again. Imports are very strong, but that is more about chips than energy.
My latest video, discussing the impact of the Iran war on the outlook for the region
The lessening of deflation has largely been driven by external factors. But domestic monetary developments have helped: the increase in PBC liquidity injections, and as shown again by today's March monetary release, the stabilisation of M1 growth and the M1:M2 ratio.
Trade data for the first 10 days are volatile. But the April data are still worth highlighting. They show strong exports and a rising trade surplus, which offers a contrast with the BOK's concerns about the cycle, and the market's worries about the KRW.
Four developments stand out: the return of inflation in China; cycle nervousness in Japan and Korea; that's despite a continued strong AI cycle that is boosting exports in Korea and Taiwan; and the visit of the KMT chair to China, the importance of which depends on Trump's meeting with Xi.
Exports in March were strong again. There aren't yet signs of the Iran war derailing the chip cycle, and while energy imports will increase more quickly, the impact on the trade surplus will be limited. The outlook for Taiwan as of now is resilient growth and higher inflation.
For me, the tone of today's BOK meeting was a surprising mix of uncertainty and conviction. On the one hand, the bank stressed that the outlook is unclear, depending on events in the Middle East. On the other, it seems very sure that inflation will be quite a lot higher than 2%, and growth lower.
That the return of PPI inflation in March was driven by an energy price shock isn't positive. In fact, though, the recovery in PPI pre-dates the Iran war, beginning in June last year. Positive inflation reinforces the macro narrative that China's cycle is more stable, supporting rates and the CNY.
I've been arguing that Taiwan is one of the most interesting macro stories in the world right now. I had the chance to lay out some of the elements in this week's Bloomberg Asia Centric podcast.
GDP growth has been below the BOK's estimate of potential almost continually since 2022. And yet core inflation hasn't dropped below target, and private services inflation – a proxy for domestically generated inflation – has picked up to above 3%. Just what is going on?
The themes around China as a relative safe haven, and firming inflation in Japan, are clear. The inflation picture in Japan supports rate hikes. Korea, by contrast, is messier: there are positive dynamics like the surging trade surplus and WGBI inclusion, but the KRW still can't stabilise.
The inflation risks evident in the Tankan can be blamed on energy prices, but output prices actually rose more than input, suggesting that firms think they can pass costs through. That's important, when the BOJ has been warning that changes in firm behaviour mean upside risks to inflation.
Government measures are restraining energy prices and so headline CPI. But the war still increases upside risks for inflation. Rising oil prices are pushing up energy and intermediate prices, export growth is strong, and core inflation has been resilient.
Today's summary release of the BOJ Tankan shows output prices rising, inflation expectations up, and the labour market tight. At the same time, business sentiment – at least for now – remains solid. Upside risks to inflation are growing again.
More interesting than today's data releases were yesterday's BOJ documents, on trends in underlying inflation, and the summary of opinions of the March MPB meeting. The BOJ is concerned about the negative TOT shock from the Middle East, but sounds more worried about upside risks to inflation.
The sharp rise in input prices in today's PMIs move China back towards rising YoY PPI for the first time since 2022. Usually, higher prices would boost PMIs too. With the rise in prices externally-driven, that is less likely now. But, I think some inflation does improve the macro cycle for China.
Some charts on regional energy supply and government attempts to cushion the impact of rising energy prices since 2022. Rough rule of thumb: spending 1% of GDP on energy subsidies leads to a reduction in headline CPI inflation of around 1ppt.
This week's three themes: 1) rising inflation despite government attempts to hold prices down; 2) growth that might be starting to wobble but hasn't clearly turned down yet; and 3) huge uncertainty about the direction of events in the Middle East.
The easy takeaway from the rise in prices and fall in sentiment in the BOK's business sentiment survey for March/April is stagflation. I think there are reasons as yet to discount the idea that activity has slowed, but if that is right, then the rise in inflation makes BOK rate hikes more likely.
Headline inflation data continue to be affected by policy measures to control energy and public services prices. The underlying picture is more stable, with core private services inflation of around 2%, PT wage growth of 5%, and PMIs above 50. The big risk, of course, is the impact of the Iran war.
In the first stage of the Iran War, China has been the relative winner, and Japan the loser. The next stage would be yet higher energy prices that challenge the sustainability of efforts to control inflation for consumers, and mean economies start to face a negative demand shock too.
This cycle in Japan continues to stand-out for the strength in services activity. In Korea, export prices rose in February. Import prices will now increase more quickly, but the net impact of the energy price shock will depend on whether the surge in semiconductor demand and prices now holds or not.