A longer piece looking at whether the rise in DRAM prices means Korea macro in 2026 will look like Taiwan macro in 2026. Also, household credit data in Korea (a bit slower), and more detailed October trade data for China, showing that while exports overall were weak, shipments of cars weren't.
I don't know nearly enough about tech to decide whether this is a memory supercycle. But it certainly looks like it might be, which raises the possibility that macro in Korea in 2026 could have shades of Taiwan macro in 2025.
The major releases today were Q3 GDP in Japan (weaker headline, but details ok) and fx settlement data in China (pointing to another month of capital inflows). Elsewhere, the big trend in Taiwan's FDI data remains the shift away from investing in China.
A recap of themes for the region: China's messy cycle; nominal re-acceleration in Japan; the semi cycle as upside risk in Korea; and Taiwan's growing external excesses.
China's IP and services activity were stable in October, but were over-shadowed by another big drop in FAI. That can't be entirely dismissed, even though the data aren't so reliable. In Japan, services activity continues to trend up. In Korea, import prices are rising, but so are semi export prices.
The October data are soft, but mixed: on the one hand investment terrible and property weak, on the other, output and services more stable. That probably doesn't add up to a change in policy. My idea of stabilisation does look a bit more tenuous, and would be over if upstream prices give way again.
Import prices are rising, but not by enough to think upstream inflation is about to explode. More interesting are export prices. Auto export prices aren't rebounding. By contrast, semiconductor export prices seem to be gaining upwards momentum – which is important given the rise in spot DRAM prices.
Today's releases show Japan PPI turning up, and China credit growth slowing down. Also today, my latest data visualisation tool, mapping China's provincial data. The first data covered is FAI, showing the weakest province in September to be Guangdong, which would usually be regarded as a powerhouse.
Relative to my idea that the underlying economy could be stabilising, today's monetary data for October are a little soft. In particular, both M1 growth and the M1:M2 ratio ticked down, and mortgage lending also slowed. Credit growth also dropped, but only because of less government borrowing.
The gap between import prices and PPI in the October data illustrates the sort of pent-up inflationary pressure in Japan that is likely to be exposed if the JPY remains so weak. Today's data also show a decent rise in auto export prices, but to a level that is still 6% below the pre-tariff level.
The continued fall in interest rates in the real economy shown in yesterday's monetary policy report from the PBC, another strong sentiment survey in Japan, and some thoughts on Korea in light of yesterday's minutes of the October BOK meeting and today's labour market data.
With October meeting minutes, export and labour market data, there's enough to review the outlook for Korea. I think the underlying economic picture remains consistent with more cuts. But the minutes show Board members continuing to prioritise concerns about KRW weakness and house price strength.
Some strong numbers in Japan today, both the Economy Watchers survey – which provides a good guide to the direction of the cycle – and the current account surplus, which in September was the highest in at least 25 years. Also today, Korean export data for the first ten days of November.
The sharp recovery in sentiment in the EW survey continued in October. The improvement is broad-based, affecting both corporates and households. That shows a lessening of the tariff and inflation shocks of 1H25, and should be reflected in the BOJ becoming more optimistic about the outlook.
In addition to yesterday's inflation data from China (stronger at the margin), today's update includes the summary of opinions from the BOJ's October meeting, September consumption data for Japan, and September wages for Taiwan.
The summary of the October BOJ meeting show a stronger consensus that the time is approaching for another rate hike. That is partly because concern about tariffs is fading. It is less about domestic demand: data today show consumption trending up, but still only very slowly.
Data last week showed Taiwan remaining as one of the world's major beneficiaries of AI adoption. A big question for 2026 is whether Korea joins the party. Other themes are fiscal uncertainty in Japan, and further signs of stabilisation in China's underlying cycle.
CPI and PPI data for October show another lessening of deflation, and leads point to that trend being sustained through year-end. That is important, and fits with my idea of a bottoming for the underlying cycle. But I am not convinced yet, with services CPI inflation still too low.
Today's trade data for October were interesting, being stronger in Taiwan, but weaker in China. Taiwan's trade surplus surged again, but despite the narrowing in China, fx reserves rose in October. Also today, a note delving into an under-explored aspect of China's FAI data.
I am running out of superlatives to describe Taiwan's export story in 2025. So I'll let the numbers speak for themselves: today's October data show semi exports have grown 70% this year, pushing the overall trade surplus last month to 30% of GDP, and the bilateral surplus with the US to 20% of GDP
Many explanations have been put forward for the drop in YoY FAI. I have another: YoY catching up with the weakness already clear in the MoM. That's tongue-in-cheek, but looking at the under-used MoM series for IP, retail sales and FAI add useful perspectives on what is happening in the economy.
China's exports, which had been so strong, were weaker in October. That could be the lagged impact of tariffs. The suddenness of the change suggests other factors are involved, but we'll find out more with next week's detailed data. For now, it is worth noting that auto exports continue to rise.
Today's data releases included Japan wages (messy, but some interesting details), Korea's current account surplus (big, but not helping the KRW), and Taiwan inflation (low compared with ROW, high compared with history). Also, a link to a slide pack summarising my views for the region.
Data today show Korea's current account surplus remaining at over 5% of GDP. The fundamental driver is a fall in borrowing by the corporate sector. This structural surplus hasn't started to support the KRW. One reasons is continued outflows from the NPS.
Wage growth was softer in September. The continued slowdown in part-time wages per hour will be a bigger concern if it persists beyond the October rise in the minimum wage. Per hour full-time wage growth is stronger than the headline, though the data are noisy.