The recovery in new property prices from Q4 faded in February, with prices dropping MoM. That makes some sense given mortgage lending, which has stopped slowing, but hasn't started to lift.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
While excavator sales will be affected by inventories and replacement demand, the recovery in the last few months is another sign, along with the construction PMI and credit growth, that the overall cycle has bottomed.
The upturn in credit growth that began in June last year is continuing. That should be helping to put a floor under nominal growth. But that comes with caveats: private-sector credit lost momentum in February, and while mortgage lending isn't slowing, it doesn't show any sign of a rebound either.
Today's shunto 2025 results are constructive, but not a game changer. Upside risks from other dynamics are bigger: part-time wages, the output gap, inflation expectations, processed food prices, rent, and pent-up inflation pressure in both PPI and public services prices.
There's no change in weak activity, and that even before Trump's reciprocal tariffs. The KRW has been stable, but the warning signs of a rebound in property have been accurate. The direction of policy rates is still down, but household debt issues will once again complicate the outlook for the BOK.
The slow but steady pick-up in wage inflation is continuing. The trend is now up to 2.5%, the highest in 20 years. The lift is being led by manufacturing, where wage inflation is nearer 4%. These trends will keep a floor under both CPI inflation, and interest rates.
The reversal of December's fall in jobs continued in February, but the rise is still being driven by employment in the public sector, and of more elderly workers. In line with very poor business sentiment, private sector employment is continuing to weaken.
Today's Q1 BOS survey shows the labour market still tight, giving a flavour for the early April Tankan. February PPI inflation eased, but the break with the YoY change in import prices is sustaining. That suggests PPI is being driven by the accumulated rise in import prices since 2021.
February's 4% YoY PPI sustains the break with import prices. In level terms, the break is more understandable: import prices usually rise more than PPI, then correct with global recession or JPY strength. As yet, they aren't happening, increasing pressure for PPI to rise.
Overall exports were a bit better in the first ten days of March, though still look to be below the peak of a few months ago. That semiconductor sales continue to slow isn't a positive sign for the outlook.
A short slidepack covering eight broad themes relevant for the region, from trade to demographics, services to surpluses.
The standout finding from this year's annual corporate survey from the Cabinet Office is the continued rise in nominal growth expectations. The five-year outlook is now almost at 3%. This is another clear sign of a rise in inflation expectations, with real growth expectations not changing at all.
Underlying pay continues to rise around 3% for regular workers and 4.5% for part-time. But bonuses and real wages were lower in January, and consumers continue to complain about rising prices. Household sentiment fell in today's EW survey, and that points to weaker activity in Q1.
The surge in exports this year isn't all front-loading and Chinese New Year. Through 2024, Taiwan's export data had been looking light relative to TSMC's sales. That gap has now been closed, meaning strong performance for TSMC can once again be thought of as implying macro strength for Taiwan.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
A decline in CPI in February was to be expected, given Chinese New Year fell in January, and there are tentative signs of deflation pressure easing. Food prices have stabilised so far in March. And the decline in core in February wasn't enough fully to reverse the strengthening seen since Q4.
Deputy governor Uchida's speech this week marked the third occasion since January where the bank has argued that the output gap is understated. That suggests more upwards pressure on prices, and thus rates. He also staked out a more positive view of QQE than the BOJ's formal view.
There is funniness in the data because of the holiday effect and likely tariff front-loading. But still, the surges in some of the flows are striking: server and semi sales, exports and the trade surplus with the US, capital goods imports. No sign at all of the sluggishness seen in the Korean data.
The BOJ's proxy for consumption dropped in January to the lowest since 2022. The population is declining, but the January data don't look much better, even in per capita terms. One reason is inflation, which continues to erode household incomes.
Korea's cycle data remain soft, with exports softening again in February. Inflation also eased last month, and with no news yet on the hoped-for supplementary budget, there's nothing new to stand in the way of the BOK's cutting cycle.
A video discussing why China isn't following Japan's path. This is the first part, looking at the seven demand-side factors that caused Japan's problems, and how China compares. The second video will discuss supply-side issues and the "deflationary mindset".
This is a good way of showing the contrasting cyclical momentum in China and Japan. Except for the sudden stops during covid, the services PMI in China is the lowest on record. In Japan, it is near the strongest.
Domestic demand in Korea has been weak for a number of months, with the economy supported by exports. But exports are now weakening too, as the semi cycle turns. No wonder the BOK is so worried about growth.
Reasons for upside risks in Japan, with implications for BOJ; conviction that China isn't following Japan's 1990s past, meaning rates should be low enough; unlike the BOK, the CBC in Taiwan won't cut rates, and might yet hike again.