Consensus was right, and the CBC didn't change rates today. The vote wasn't unanimous, with two members voting for a hike. However, some of the property measures were loosened. To me, this suggests that policy is too loose, and thus that the gradual warming up of inflation will continue.

I expect the CBC to hike. That was also my view 3M ago, and then I was wrong, and the strong consensus is that I'll be wrong now too. Underlying my view is that the CBC can't be confident inflation has peaked. Instead, with real rates negative and the TWD weak, price pressures are likely to persist.

Headline growth rates are slowing, but the government's qualitative assessment remains bullish, there are more signs of life in domestic demand and services, and while a 2026 inflation forecast of a bit over 2% isn't so high, it has been raised four quarters in a row, and is above the policy rate.

Annualised regular wage growth in both manufacturing and services has been above 3% since 2024. In Q2 in manufacturing, it has been near 4%. The risk remains that the export cycle now slows, but TSMC's strong sales and elevated manufacturing overtime don't suggest that is happening yet.

Both headline and core CPI inflation ticked down in July as energy prices eased. However, underlying inflation feels firm, with sequential core failing to break below 2%; import price, PPI inflation and CPI computer price inflation rising to decade highs; and services inflation running at 2.6%.

June's core inflation of 2.3% isn't high in an absolute sense. But outside LNY, it is the highest since the 1990s, and, remarkably, above both the policy rate and 10-year yields. Energy inflation will ease, but with wage growth of 2.7% and rising, and equity prices strong, rates really look too low.

The CBC didn't change policy today. It increased its growth forecast, but didn't sound excited about the outlook. It warned about excesses related to equities, but didn't announce any remedial policies. Inflation is expected to remain below 2%.

Services inflation averaged 0.7% in the 20 years before 2020. In the last five years it has been 2.3%, and is now rising again. Some of that reflects energy prices, with air fares rising 10% YoY in May. But there is also the backdrop of a strong economy, rising stockmarket and rising wage growth.

Today's Q1 GDP data show the economy growing more quickly than any time in over 40 years. The government thinks that continues: in the forecast, downside risk from Iran isn't mentioned, but trickle down from semi to the real economy is. CPI was also revised up, even if it remains (just) below 2%.

My initial interpretation of the Xi-Trump meeting looks wrong. While in the official talks neither side gave much, in a subsequent interview with Fox news, President Trump softened US support for Taiwan. Over the medium-term, that could be significant for politics in Taiwan, and currency valuations.

April trade data show little damage from the Iran war. If the crisis remains limited to energy prices, Taiwan should be somewhat insulated. Energy imports are small relative to chip exports, and while import prices will rise, export prices are now also increasing for the first time in a generation.

Latest video, discussing one of my main themes: that Taiwan macro is more relevant for global investors than it has been for a long time.

Exports in March were strong again. There aren't yet signs of the Iran war derailing the chip cycle, and while energy imports will increase more quickly, the impact on the trade surplus will be limited. The outlook for Taiwan as of now is resilient growth and higher inflation.

I've been arguing that Taiwan is one of the most interesting macro stories in the world right now. I had the chance to lay out some of the elements in this week's Bloomberg Asia Centric podcast.

The surge in the current account surplus of January-September continued into the end of 2025. In Q4, the surplus reached almost 30% of GDP. The government's GDP forecast implies that will be roughly the size of the full-year surplus in 2026. Taiwan needs huge capital outflows to keep the TWD stable.

Taiwan's macro story is fascinating. Rarely has growth in such a rich economy accelerated so much, with reindustrialisation and huge external surpluses, at the same time as rates and the currency barely move. I'd think that something has to give. Will 2026 finally be the year that it does?

Even with data today showing a dip in exports in December, Taiwan's trade surplus last year reached the sort of sky-high levels last seen before the big TWD appreciation of the 1980s. Barring a real dislocation in AI hardware demand, underlying pressure for renewed appreciation will grow in 2026.

There is little growth in exports outside of tech in general, and semiconductors specifically. But the surge in chip exports is big enough to offset all the weakness in other products. The overall trade surplus eased back in November, but the bilateral surplus with the US reached 25% of Taiwan GDP.

In today's GDP release, the government raised estimated growth for Q1, Q2, and Q3. The FY forecast was raised by almost 3ppts to 7.4%. But because of AI, officials remain bullish about the outlook, and so raised the forecast for 2026 as well, And yet, none of this is expected to impact inflation.

I am running out of superlatives to describe Taiwan's export story in 2025. So I'll let the numbers speak for themselves: today's October data show semi exports have grown 70% this year, pushing the overall trade surplus last month to 30% of GDP, and the bilateral surplus with the US to 20% of GDP

Macro volatility – in inflation, growth, property prices and the TWD – eased in Q3, and it was no surprise that the CBC was on hold today. That won't change if AI demand growth slows. But the AI cycle has proven tough to forecast, and I'd expect the CBC will also be faced with more TWD strength.

August data today show the impact of the weaker TWD since July: fx reserves fell, import prices ticked up MoM, and CPI inflation rose. The lesson is that without currency strength, the step-change in economic growth since 2020 is more likely to show up in domestic prices.

July export orders data show a continued reshoring, but overall export orders have clearly peaked. Today's Q2 BOP data show the rise in exports has further boosted the current account surplus. With the surplus so large, the TWD is vulnerable to the sort of shifts in capital flows seen in Q2.

The government today confirmed the export surge of 1H – and released much less pessimistic forecasts for 2H. The underlying story is simple: AI-related demand offsetting the impact of TWD appreciation and tariffs. Exports are now expected to grow almost 25% this year, and GDP by 4.5%.

The export surge is boosting demand for labour, with data today showing manufacturing overtime hours in June near the highest in 15 years, and wage growth of close to 4% YoY. Overall wage growth has also trended up, but less quickly, because the demand:supply balance in services isn't as tight.