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Exports in March were strong again. There aren't yet signs of the Iran war derailing the chip cycle, and while energy imports will increase more quickly, the impact on the trade surplus will be limited. The outlook for Taiwan as of now is resilient growth and higher inflation.
I've been arguing that Taiwan is one of the most interesting macro stories in the world right now. I had the chance to lay out some of the elements in this week's Bloomberg Asia Centric podcast.
The surge in the current account surplus of January-September continued into the end of 2025. In Q4, the surplus reached almost 30% of GDP. The government's GDP forecast implies that will be roughly the size of the full-year surplus in 2026. Taiwan needs huge capital outflows to keep the TWD stable.
Taiwan's macro story is fascinating. Rarely has growth in such a rich economy accelerated so much, with reindustrialisation and huge external surpluses, at the same time as rates and the currency barely move. I'd think that something has to give. Will 2026 finally be the year that it does?
Even with data today showing a dip in exports in December, Taiwan's trade surplus last year reached the sort of sky-high levels last seen before the big TWD appreciation of the 1980s. Barring a real dislocation in AI hardware demand, underlying pressure for renewed appreciation will grow in 2026.
There is little growth in exports outside of tech in general, and semiconductors specifically. But the surge in chip exports is big enough to offset all the weakness in other products. The overall trade surplus eased back in November, but the bilateral surplus with the US reached 25% of Taiwan GDP.
In today's GDP release, the government raised estimated growth for Q1, Q2, and Q3. The FY forecast was raised by almost 3ppts to 7.4%. But because of AI, officials remain bullish about the outlook, and so raised the forecast for 2026 as well, And yet, none of this is expected to impact inflation.
I am running out of superlatives to describe Taiwan's export story in 2025. So I'll let the numbers speak for themselves: today's October data show semi exports have grown 70% this year, pushing the overall trade surplus last month to 30% of GDP, and the bilateral surplus with the US to 20% of GDP
Macro volatility – in inflation, growth, property prices and the TWD – eased in Q3, and it was no surprise that the CBC was on hold today. That won't change if AI demand growth slows. But the AI cycle has proven tough to forecast, and I'd expect the CBC will also be faced with more TWD strength.
August data today show the impact of the weaker TWD since July: fx reserves fell, import prices ticked up MoM, and CPI inflation rose. The lesson is that without currency strength, the step-change in economic growth since 2020 is more likely to show up in domestic prices.
July export orders data show a continued reshoring, but overall export orders have clearly peaked. Today's Q2 BOP data show the rise in exports has further boosted the current account surplus. With the surplus so large, the TWD is vulnerable to the sort of shifts in capital flows seen in Q2.
The government today confirmed the export surge of 1H – and released much less pessimistic forecasts for 2H. The underlying story is simple: AI-related demand offsetting the impact of TWD appreciation and tariffs. Exports are now expected to grow almost 25% this year, and GDP by 4.5%.
The export surge is boosting demand for labour, with data today showing manufacturing overtime hours in June near the highest in 15 years, and wage growth of close to 4% YoY. Overall wage growth has also trended up, but less quickly, because the demand:supply balance in services isn't as tight.
The surge in exports continued in July. Exports have now grown 30% just this year, and the trade surplus has risen to 20% of GDP. But the underlying dynamics shifted last month. Rather than semi exports to the US, the big driver was other exports to ASEAN. That looks more like tariff front-loading.
The biggest takeaway from today's July price data is the big fall in TWD import prices – and thus PPI and goods in CPI – on the back of currency appreciation. Core actually ticked up in July, and probably isn't going back to the sub-1% rate of pre-covid. But I doubt it gets back above 2% either.
The PMIs haven't been great lead indicators this year: they've been mainly below 50 in Q2, and yet export data have been absurdly strong. Some of that is because the export story has become so concentrated in semiconductors. Still, it is likely that the real economy will be quite a lot weaker in 2H.
It isn't news, but the strength of exports in today's GDP release is still eye-catching. It keeps Taiwan on the much higher post-2020 plane of growth. But with consumption weakening, GDP is now almost all about exports. If there's been lots of tariff front-loading, 2H25 will look very different.
Three things stood out in TSMC's earnings call yesterday: the lack of talk of "tariffs", the bullishness on demand, and confidence on margins despite TWD strength. The message has macro significance, with one risk that while TSMC and the government expects a much slower 2H, that is too pessimistic.
Overall exports, and the trade surplus with the US, continued to surge in June. That Taiwan nonetheless wasn't the recipient of a Trump letter may be because of the sharp rise in the TWD. Other data today show that helping to push down inflation, opening up space for interest rate cuts.
My model points to a rising risk of CBC tightening. But that reflects the export blow-out of 1H25, and neither markets nor officials expect that to persist. Moreover, there are the inklings of a structural rise in the TWD, which would mean tightening via the currency. Rates could actually be cut.
This year's surge in export orders continued in April, but the drop in the diffusion is warning of a pullback. For the current account, the strength in exports this year has been offset by rising imports and a smaller income surplus. For the TWD, export inflows have been offset by equity outflows.
A video bringing together the arguments I have been making for the last few months on how the economic factors that that helped anchor the TWD in its tight 28-33 range from the late 1990s are now changing.
The market sees TWD moves as a function of US pressure and lifers. The CBC says it is all about exporters. I see a step-change in exports from 2020 that has ended deflation and exacerbated the CA surplus. The TWD consequences of that shift are stronger if US tariffs don't trigger a global recession.
I can't claim to have expected the 10% surge in the TWD in the last couple of days. But I have been arguing for a while that the risks of a structural appreciation of the currency were real and rising. This is a brief presentation from March that highlights the issues.
GDP growth in Q125 reached almost 10% saar. That is all about exports, and so is vulnerable to tariffs. But it also furthers the step-change in growth evident since 2020. Before then, Taiwan was growing at a similar pace to Korea. Now, the two economies couldn't look more different.