The surge in exports continued in July. Exports have now grown 30% just this year, and the trade surplus has risen to 20% of GDP. But the underlying dynamics shifted last month. Rather than semi exports to the US, the big driver was other exports to ASEAN. That looks more like tariff front-loading.

The biggest takeaway from today's July price data is the big fall in TWD import prices – and thus PPI and goods in CPI – on the back of currency appreciation. Core actually ticked up in July, and probably isn't going back to the sub-1% rate of pre-covid. But I doubt it gets back above 2% either.

The PMIs haven't been great lead indicators this year: they've been mainly below 50 in Q2, and yet export data have been absurdly strong. Some of that is because the export story has become so concentrated in semiconductors. Still, it is likely that the real economy will be quite a lot weaker in 2H.

It isn't news, but the strength of exports in today's GDP release is still eye-catching. It keeps Taiwan on the much higher post-2020 plane of growth. But with consumption weakening, GDP is now almost all about exports. If there's been lots of tariff front-loading, 2H25 will look very different.

Three things stood out in TSMC's earnings call yesterday: the lack of talk of "tariffs", the bullishness on demand, and confidence on margins despite TWD strength. The message has macro significance, with one risk that while TSMC and the government expects a much slower 2H, that is too pessimistic.

Overall exports, and the trade surplus with the US, continued to surge in June. That Taiwan nonetheless wasn't the recipient of a Trump letter may be because of the sharp rise in the TWD. Other data today show that helping to push down inflation, opening up space for interest rate cuts.

My model points to a rising risk of CBC tightening. But that reflects the export blow-out of 1H25, and neither markets nor officials expect that to persist. Moreover, there are the inklings of a structural rise in the TWD, which would mean tightening via the currency. Rates could actually be cut.

This year's surge in export orders continued in April, but the drop in the diffusion is warning of a pullback. For the current account, the strength in exports this year has been offset by rising imports and a smaller income surplus. For the TWD, export inflows have been offset by equity outflows.

A video bringing together the arguments I have been making for the last few months on how the economic factors that that helped anchor the TWD in its tight 28-33 range from the late 1990s are now changing.

The market sees TWD moves as a function of US pressure and lifers. The CBC says it is all about exporters. I see a step-change in exports from 2020 that has ended deflation and exacerbated the CA surplus. The TWD consequences of that shift are stronger if US tariffs don't trigger a global recession.

I can't claim to have expected the 10% surge in the TWD in the last couple of days. But I have been arguing for a while that the risks of a structural appreciation of the currency were real and rising. This is a brief presentation from March that highlights the issues.

GDP growth in Q125 reached almost 10% saar. That is all about exports, and so is vulnerable to tariffs. But it also furthers the step-change in growth evident since 2020. Before then, Taiwan was growing at a similar pace to Korea. Now, the two economies couldn't look more different.

Taiwan macro doesn't attract much attention, but its experience matters. Taiwan was most exposed to the 2000s China shock. That it then suffered near-deflation reflected tight fiscal policy, a lesson that needs to be learnt in dealing with the latest shock, this time emanating from the US.

In advance of the CBC meeting this week, a short slide pack on the key themes in Taiwan. In particular, the rise in inflation (I took the photo at my favourite bread shop here today) and Trump's agenda keep the TWD in play for a structural realignment stronger.

The spike in inflation seen in January isn't unexpected given consumer spending on the back of this year's early Chinese New Year. The strength of exports can't be explained away in the same way, and suggests Taiwan's relative outperformance is continuing.

Despite a surge in capex, GDP growth slowed in Q424 to 1.8% YoY, the lowest since September 2023. 2025 as a whole should be better, with modest growth in exports and private consumption. The upside risk is wage growth feeding into stronger consumption. Downside comes from the Trump tariff threat.

Already Taiwan's dominant firm, strong 2024 results mean TSMC has now doubled in size just since 2021. The firm remaining bullish for 2025 is this a reason to be optimistic about Taiwan's exports, but also to think the domestic cycle can warm up further. The contrast with Korea is huge.

Taiwan has the strongest cyclical picture in the region. It isn't gaining further momentum, so rate hikes aren't likely, but nor are cuts. The other big factor is Trump. He won't like either Taiwan's massive trade surplus, or its modest military spending.

The CBC kept policy unchanged yesterday, and won't be in a rush to move in 2025. Growth will be slower, but the bank isn't particularly worried about either exports, or domestic demand. Optimism about consumption is partly because of expected wage hikes, which in turn will support inflation.

There's rarely much interest in Taiwan macro. But 2025 could be different: with post-2020 domestic economic lift-off, and the return of Trump, the circumstances that have kept the TWD undervalued for 20 years might be changing. This is a detailed chart pack looking at the issues involved.

There's a possibility that TSMC's success is pushing Taiwan into unchartered waters, where the CBC needs to sound hawkish, when the external imbalance is as big as it has ever been. If Taiwan's period of zero inflation has passed, there's a good chance TWD undervaluation will be challenged too.

Taiwan's CBC kept rates on hold yesterday, but hiked the RRR to control housing. More interesting was the bank's very benign outlook: growth neither fast nor slow, and inflation falling to just within its target range. Particularly regarding inflation, that doesn't allow much room for error.

While exports jumped in August, with signs that the semi upswing is losing steam, it still seems likely that the export peak is near. Pretty much all the growth is coming from the US, which is propelling a surge in the bilateral trade surplus. That makes Taiwan vulnerable if Trump wins re-election.

After faltering in 2023, wage growth is now back on the stronger trend that began in 2021. The recovery in the manufacturing cycle gives us confidence that this can at least be sustained, but we'd still like to see a clearer lift in exports.