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In Q3, the economy contracted. Leading indicators suggests that this is noise, and that a mild rate of growth should resume. But corporate sentiment remains unstable, and consumers continue to feel the pressure of rising prices.
October data confirm the message of the PMIs that the cycle remains weak. There continue to some tentative signs of a floor, which has a bigger chance of holding given the policy moves of the last few days. But the softness of property sales suggest the foundations for any recovery remain weak.
The authorities have relaxed covid and property restrictions. It feels very unlikely that the economic disruption caused by efforts to contain the pandemic is yet over. But taken together, the policy shifts do further rebalance what previously were overwhelmingly downwards risks for the economy.
The monetary data aren't bullish, but are more constructive than the headlines suggest. That's because credit growth outside of government borrowing is rising. This keeps alive the possibility that China is through the worst, though such an interpretation is a stretch as long as M1 growth is weak.
In October, headline PPI fell back into deflation, and CPI inflation eased quite sharply too. But there are signs that China is nearer the end of this deflation shock than the beginning.
It isn't enough yet, but there are signs that the labour market is starting to cool. The unemployment rate remains low, but employment was more or less unchanged in October for the fifth consecutive month. The risks for the BOK are shifting.
Exports are starting to contract YoY, and inflation remains stable. Core CPI bears some monitoring, but it is unlikely the CBC will hike again.
Underlying dynamics in both the labour market and consumption suggest the economy remains on a recovery path. But the positive impact of these trends continues to be offset by inflation.
The two big recent catalysts have been 1) that the new leadership ends China's growth story; and 2) zero covid is about to end. All told, this chatter hasn't taken the market far. For the industrial cycle, there remain tentative signs of a bottom.
YoY export growth fell to zero in October. More downside is ahead, though surging car shipments suggest autos might buck this trend. Import demand is also slowing. It should contract aggressively in the next 6M, though that looks pessimistic given commodity prices and imports in the PMI.
Early data show some deterioration in China's financial account in Q3. The shift though isn't as significant as might be expected, and the current account improved. The data won't do much to boost the CNY. But at face value, they aren't a reason for a sharper sell-off.
The tick-up in headline CPI shouldn't persist. Core CPI inflation will likely prove more stubborn, but rather than prices spiralling up, the bigger risk right now is a sharp slowdown in economic activity in 1H23. This should provide justification for a BOK pivot, as long as the Fed does the same.
The official manufacturing PMI ticked up in October, but only to 45.4. The Markit version fell to a new post-2009 low of just 41.5. The economy is likely contracting, and with inflation pressure already not particularly strong, it seems unlikely the central bank will feel a need to hike rates again.
Korean exports are now falling in YoY terms, and there is more downside ahead. This is another sign that activity will soon be in cutting territory for the BOK. The fall in exports is meanwhile keeping the trade balance in deficit, meaning flows remain a negative factor for the KRW.
The PMIs remain weak, with the only bright spots being construction, and prices. The cycle may have found a floor, but only a weak one.
Taiwan's IP data are another sign of a sharp downturn in the region's industrial cycle. IP fell more than 5% MoM in September for only the fifth time since 2008. This weakness hasn't yet started to affect the domestic economy, with the labour market and retail sales stable in September.
Some slides from a brief presentation I gave yesterday. It was in three parts: the deflation problem; the short-term outlook; and the Congress contradiction.
It didn't quite there yet in November, but in the next couple of months business sentiment will most likely be back at levels where, far rather than hiking 50bp, the BOK has historically been cutting.
Inflation expectations rose in October. That will keep the BOK hawkish, even though falling property price expectations add to downside risks for growth into 2023.
There are signs that the economy is bottoming, in the form of property sales, excavator sales and, to a lesser extent, property starts. These though are tentative, and need to strengthen before concluding the economy is through the worst.
The EW survey suggests the economy is growing, but slowly. Inflation is rising, dampening consumer sentiment, and manufacturing sentiment has weakened, but there's some offset from post-covid normalisation. This picture suggests the BOJ can for now continue to tolerate the weakening of the JPY.
Exports fell again in October, and excluding ships, are now down almost 20% from the peak. So far, the weakness is concentrated in shipments to Asia. The real risk is sales to DM will be the next shoe to fall.
Unsurprisingly, export orders fell YoY in September. The weakness remains concentrated in demand from China. Orders from the US and EU have so far remained elevated. The risk is that this demand from DM will be the next shoe to drop.
With September's monetary data suggesting a further fall in liquidity preference and M1 growth, it still doesn't look like the economy is poised for a turnaround. But it is starting to feel like the risks around the cycle are less to the downside than they have been for the last few months.
Korea is starting to look a bit less inflationary, with import price inflation easing, and the labour market no longer tightening. But the BOK remains hawkish, worrying that the weakness in the KRW will drive inflation higher.